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ESSAY
TEXT AS TRUCE: A PEACE PROPOSAL FOR THE
SUPREME COURT'S COSTLY WAR OVER THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Andrew B. Coan*
INTRODUCTION

Courts and commentators have debated the original meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment for more than 100 years. This debate has a peculiar
characteristic, however. It has paid remarkably little attention to the text of
the Eleventh Amendment.I That text reads as follows: "The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
2
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
Read against the background of Article III, Section 2, which grants federal
courts jurisdiction over "all Cases, in Law or Equity, arising under this
Constitution [and] the Laws of the United States," 3 this text appears to
extinguish federal jurisdiction over all suits against states by citizens of
another state, while leaving intact jurisdiction over suits arising under the
Constitution or federal laws where the parties are not so aligned-most
notably, suits by citizens against their own states.
Neither the presently dominant nor the main competing interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment reads the Amendment in this way. The currently
ascendant judicial interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment holds that the
Amendment stands not so much for what it says as for the presupposition it
confirms-that states are not amenable to suits by individuals without their
consent.4 The main competing interpretation, known as the "diversity
theory" and embraced consistently for the last twenty years by a four* Law Clerk to Judge Richard A. Posner, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, 2005-2006. J.D., Stanford Law School, 2005; B.A., University of Wisconsin, 2000.
1 thank Lawrence Lessig and William Skinner for insightful discussion of this project in its
early stages; Judge Posner for helpful comments on an earlier draft; and William and James
Coan for critical feedback throughout the drafting process. All views-and of course
errors-are my own.
1. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989).

2. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
3. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
4. See infra Part I.B. 1.
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Justice minority of the Supreme Court 5 and by a majority of academic
commentators, 6 holds that the Eleventh Amendment does not limit federal
question jurisdiction at all; rather, it provides a limiting construction to the
citizen-state diversity head of jurisdiction, barring its application to cases
7
where states are defendants.
The historical debate between proponents of these two interpretations has
been vigorous but ultimately inconclusive. 8 This Essay argues that this
debate (and the originalist approach of judges and commentators on all
sides of it) has had significant costs. It has produced a legal doctrine rife
with internal inconsistencies, 9 and it has, for two decades, divided the
Supreme Court along transparently political lines, creating the appearance
that the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is driven more by the
personal views of the Justices than constitutional principle. 10 Given the
Amendment's irresolvably ambiguous history, it is simply not productive
for the Court to maintain its present course. Consequently, this Essay calls
for a truce in the war over the Eleventh Amendment's original meaning.
By adopting a textualist interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, the
Court can achieve a more coherent doctrine and restore the appearance that
its decisions are grounded in principle rather than politics.
I. THE WAR

In this part, I survey the historical debate over the original meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment. I do not take sides in this war.Il I simply report the
positions of the various parties with an eye to promoting a peaceful
settlement.
A. FirstShots
The first shots of the war were fired in 1890 in Hans v. Louisiana,12 the
first case to devote serious attention to the original meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment. In that case, plaintiff Hans attempted to sue the state of
Louisiana to collect an unpaid debt and argued that his case should be heard
in federal court under the Contracts Clause. 13 Because he was a citizen of
Louisiana, the text of the Eleventh Amendment did not clearly bar his suit.
5. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
693 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. See Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 1
(2002).
7. See, e.g., id. at 6.
8. See infra Part I.C. 1.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. To the extent I have sympathies, they lie with the textualist provocateurs discussed
in Part I.B.3, especially John Manning. But each side's cause has merits and weaknesses,
12. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment could
not have intended to bar suits against states by citizens of another state,
while leaving states open to suit by their own citizens. 14 The Amendment
was important, the Court held, not so much for what it said but for the
presupposition it confirmed: that
states are not amenable to suit by
15
individuals without their consent.
B. Waging History
Hans was adhered to more or less without event for the next seventy-five
years, at which point its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment came
under pressure, initially from a slim majority of the Court1 6 and eventually
from a series of increasingly vigorous dissents advancing the diversity
theory. 17 From 1989 to 1996, something like the diversity theory carried
the day, based on the decision of a four-Justice plurality in Pennsylvaniav.
Union Gas.18 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,19 however, a fiveJustice majority overruled Union Gas, embracing the Hans view that the
Eleventh Amendment stands for a broad "constitutional principle" of state
sovereign immunity, which Congress cannot abrogate pursuant to its Article
I powers. 20 Justice David Souter's stinging dissent embraced the diversity
theory, 2 1 and the battle has been raging in the Supreme Court and law
journals ever since. 2 2 The following subsections briefly review the
principal arguments for each theory, along with the arguments of two
provocative scholars who are the only significant commentators to advocate
14. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-11.
15. Id. at 15.
16. Cf Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 198 (1964)
(Brennan, J., writing for a five-Justice majority) (holding Alabama had constructively
consented to suit under the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA") by operating a
railroad when Congress had conditioned participation in that activity on amenability to suit).
17. See, e.g., Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 320-22 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (articulating the diversity
theory); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (same); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100-85 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (same); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 693-705 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
18. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 5-23 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion)
(holding that Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
powers). While some commentators speak of the diversity theory and the abrogation view
embraced in Union Gas as distinct, the two theories do not differ meaningfully in their view
of the Eleventh Amendment, which both read as imposing a limiting construction on Article
III's citizen-state diversity head of jurisdiction. The abrogation theory simply recognizes an
antecedent common law principle of state sovereign immunity, which Congress may
abrogate in the exercise of its enumerated powers. The discussion in this Essay therefore
does not distinguish between the two theories.
19. 517 U.S. 44.
20. Id. at 64-65.
21. Id. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting).
22. It was raging much earlier, too. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant
of JurisdictionRather than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983)
(advocating diversity theory).

2514

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

a textualist interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as an account of its
original meaning.
1. State Sovereign Immunity
The primary argument for the state sovereign immunity view is the one
the Court made in Hans. If states were motivated to ratify the Eleventh
Amendment out of concem with bankrupting liability on their war debts, it
did not make any sense for the Amendment to have barred suits against
23
states only by citizens of another state, and not the states' own citizens.
Recent courts have also pointed to the writings of Alexander Hamilton, as
well as the arguments of John Marshall and James Madison at the Virginia
ratifying convention, as evidence that states did not give up their traditional
sovereign immunity when they entered the union. 24 They enjoyed this
immunity at common law, it is argued, and nothing in the "plan of the
convention" 2 5 necessarily deprived them of it.
Ironically, this debate at the ratifying conventions that is alluded to in
Federalist 81 focused on the citizen-state diversity head of jurisdiction in
Article III, which both the state sovereign immunity proponents and
diversity theorists agree the Eleventh Amendment was intended to limit to
suits where states were plaintiffs. The federal question head of jurisdiction,
which has been the source of greatest controversy in debates over the
Eleventh Amendment, was apparently not the subject of any pre-ratification
debate-at least none that remains extant. 26 Proponents of state sovereign
immunity have therefore argued that this provision, which the text of the
Eleventh Amendment does not address directly, could not have been
understood as overriding state sovereign immunity. 27 If it had been, they
reason, it would have provoked the same kind of controversy provoked by
citizen-state diversity jurisdiction.
On this theory, the Eleventh
Amendment merely returned the Constitution to its original pre-Chisholm v.
Georgia28 meaning, under which, the sovereign immunity theorists claim,
states were not amenable to suit by private citizens without their consent.

23. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-12, 14-15 (1890).
24. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716-18 (1999); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at
70 nn. 12 & 13 and accompanying text.
25. The phrase comes from The Federalist No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).

26. Id.at 419.
27. One recent commentator has argued that, as originally understood, an Article III
"case" or "controversy" did not exist where a court lacked personal jurisdiction over both
parties, which it would never have had over an unconsenting state. See Caleb Nelson,
Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine ofPersonalJurisdiction,115 Harv. L. Rev. 1559 (2002).
On this ground, Nelson reads all the Article III heads of jurisdiction as qualified by a
background understanding of state sovereign immunity.
28. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Chisholm, of course, is the case that provoked the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment by holding that citizen-state diversity jurisdiction
authorized the federal courts to hear an assumpsit action brought by a citizen of South
Carolina against the state of Georgia without its consent.
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2. The Diversity Theory
The diversity theory, which at least four Supreme Court Justices have
consistently embraced since 1985,29 was first articulated on the Court by
Justice William Brennan in his solo dissent in Employees of the Department
of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare.30 There, Justice Brennan argued that the best way to make sense
of the Amendment is to view it merely as enacting a limiting construction
on the citizen-state diversity head of jurisdiction. In other words, the
Amendment was meant to force courts to interpret citizen-state diversity
jurisdiction just as Madison and Marshall both said it would be interpreted
at the Virginia Convention-as only applying to states as plaintiffs, not as
defendants. 3 1 The Amendment was not, the diversity theorists argue,
intended to have any effect on federal question jurisdiction. In fact, in their
view, it even allowed federal courts to hear suits "against one of the United
States by citizens of another state," so long as they were independently
grounded in federal question jurisdiction.
In this respect, the diversity theory directly conflicts with the text of the
Eleventh Amendment, which on its face plainly bars such suits without
regard to the asserted grounds for federal jurisdiction. In support of their
contratextual reading, however, the diversity theorists point out that before
sending the current version of the Eleventh Amendment to the states for
ratification, Congress considered a different version, which would have
established exactly the broad principle of sovereign immunity that the
Court's current majority endorses. 32 Rejecting this version, Congress opted
for the very precise text of the Eleventh Amendment as we know it today.
It would be absurd, the diversity theorists argue, to read this precise text as
equivalent to the draft Amendment that Congress rejected. Furthermore, if
the Amendment was intended to bar all suits against non-consenting States,
as the Court's current majority claims, it was very ineptly33drafted: It does
not even mention suits against states by their own citizens.

29. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
30. 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716-18 (1999) (quoting 3 The Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 533, 555 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1854)).
32. This version read as follows:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the judicial
courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United
States, at the suit of any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a
foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without
the United States.
Fletcher, supra note 22, at 1058.
33. See id. at 1060-61. The diversity theorists themselves, of course, are open to the
same objection. If the Eleventh Amendment were only meant to affect citizen-state diversity
jurisdiction, its apparent ban on "any suit against one of the United States by citizens of
another state" would have to be considered fairly inept.
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3. Textualist Provocateurs
Both the state sovereign immunity theory and the diversity theory take
for granted that a textualist interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
would be absurd from an originalist perspective. The proponents of these
views can envision no possible reason why the states that ratified the
Eleventh Amendment to ban suits by citizens of other states would have
chosen to leave themselves subject to suits by their own citizens. The
virtual unanimity on this point is rather astonishing, given the oft-professed
preference of some current Justices for plain text readings of statutes. The
assumption of a textualist interpretation's absurdity is so universal,
however, that no majority or dissenting opinion since Hans has even taken
34
time to spell out the reasons for it.
Nor has the academic literature devoted any substantial attention to a
textualist interpretation. Indeed, although Eleventh Amendment literature
is one of the richest in modem legal scholarship, only two significant
commentators have argued that a textualist interpretation makes sense-or
at least deserves consideration-as an originalist matter. These two
36
provocateurs are Professor Larry Marshal 3 5 and Professor John Manning.
Marshall's and Manning's arguments, while differing in emphasis, share a
common core. Both argue that, for precise constitutional texts like the
Eleventh Amendment (and Article III which provides the relevant
background), a textualist reading deserves a strong presumption of validity
as an expression of original meaning. 3 7 Conversely, both argue that a very
strong historical showing should be required to justify departing from the
plain meaning of such texts based on "the 'I know what was really
intended' excuse."' 38
The upshot is that, so long as a textualist
interpretation is not absurd from an originalist perspective, an originalist
39
should be obliged to follow it.
To demonstrate that a textualist interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment is warranted under this standard, Marshall makes a very game,
and often convincing, argument that a plain text reading of the Amendment

34. Cf Alden, 527 U.S. at 723-24 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1890),
on the absurdity of a textualist interpretation).
35. See Marshall, supra note 1.
36. John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
ConstitutionalTexts, 113 Yale L.J. 1663 (2004).
37. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 1349; Manning, supra note 36, at 1715-16.
38. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 1350.
39. The style of the argument expressed here is Marshall's. Manning makes a similar
substantive point in the jargon of public choice theory on statutory interpretation. See
Manning, supra note 36, at 1715-16 ("For now, it suffices to note that because the legislative
process is complex, path-dependent, and often opaque, textualists believe that it is difficult if
not impossible for judges to go behind a statute to determine why the final text took the form
that it did. . . . [T]here is little reason to believe that the shape of [constitutional]
Amendments depends any less on the complexities of the legislative process.").
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is not, in fact, absurd as an account of its original meaning. 40 There are, he
points out, a number of reasons the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment
may have intended it to be applied just as it reads. This is particularly
apparent if we accept, as Marshall thinks we should, that the primary
motive for the Eleventh Amendment was not a theological conception of
state sovereignty but a very practical fear of bankrupting liability, which the
Amendment's drafters balanced against their desire to preserve as much
government accountability as possible. 4 1 Since many of the states' biggest
creditors were out-of-state or foreign speculators while most states'
violations of federal rights in 1795 would affect only their own citizens, the
text of the Eleventh Amendment was, Marshall argues, a perfectly
sensible-and certainly intelligible-means
of striking the balance between
42
immunity and accountability.
From this apparent historical plausibility, Marshall draws the strong
conclusion that a textualist interpretation is the only approach to the
Eleventh Amendment that withstands scrutiny. Manning does not go quite
so far. While he agrees that the Amendment's plain text precludes the view
that the Amendment itself created a broad doctrine of state sovereign
immunity, 43 he equivocates on the more difficult question of whether such
an immunity might be derived independently from some less precise
constitutional source, such as Article III, the Tenth Amendment, or the
structural principles of federalism.
Although Marshall and Manning, like this Essay, both argue for a
textualist interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, their arguments are
very different from the argument advanced here. Essentially, Marshall and
Manning add a provocative third perspective to the debate over the original
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. This is an important contribution,
but it does nothing to address the costs of the Court's sustained and highly
politicized war over the original meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. In
fact, it embraces the fundamental premise of that war-the view that,
despite the Amendment's ambiguous history, contemporary interpretation
should focus on the Amendment's original meaning. This Essay, by
contrast, argues that the dominance, and fundamental indeterminacy, of
originalist arguments is itself the principal problem with the Court's postHans Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Therefore, this Essay argues for
a textualist interpretation-not on originalist grounds-but as an alternative
to the costly, irresolvable debate originalism has produced.
40. As he points out, this is not setting the bar especially high, but previous (and most
subsequent) commentators had thought meeting even such a low bar too difficult even to
attempt.
41. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 1354-55.
42. See id. Again, Manning's argument is similar, but leans more on public choice
jargon.
Manning also focuses more on the broad theoretical point of how precise
constitutional texts should be read in light of public choice insights, and thus makes less of
an attempt to demonstrate the historical plausibility of a textualist interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment. See generally Manning, supra note 36.
43. See id. at 1669-70.
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C. Stalemate
These three positions-the state sovereign immunity theory, the diversity
theory, and the approach of the textualist provocateurs Marshall and
Manning-represent, in broad brush, the range of the current interpretive
debate over the Eleventh Amendment. 44 All of these positions, it bears
emphasizing, operate within an originalist framework, which takes for
granted that the interpretation of the Amendment should be guided by what
its drafters intended or by what it was understood to mean at the time of its
ratification. For all the vigor of this debate, however, it is now generally
acknowledged that no originalist theory has anything like a knockdown
45
argument.
1. Irresolvable Ambiguity
The bottom line is this: The history of the Eleventh Amendment is
fundamentally inconclusive.
There is simply not enough available
contemporaneous evidence to support a confident choice among the three
competing views. 4 6 In particular, the state sovereign immunity theory and

the diversity theory are at their very core based on what might be called an
"unsaid"-a set of assumptions taken for granted by the drafters and
ratifiers of the Amendment, which are not reflected in the text because in
their historical context they were understood without being articulated. 4 7
The problem is that, if they did not need to be said in the text, these
assumptions were unlikely to be said elsewhere either. And so the prospect
of good historical evidence turning up to confirm or refute one of these
48
theories is minimal.
Even proponents of an originalist approach have acknowledged the
inconclusiveness of this history, although academics have predictably been
more willing to do so than judges. Then-Professor William Fletcher, for
example, perhaps the most prominent diversity theorist, admitted that
"neither the immunity nor the potential liability of the states to private suit
44. There is also a robust functionalist debate about the desirability of state sovereign
immunity that this Essay does not attempt to address-partly for reasons of space and partly
because injecting this debate into the judicial interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
would, even more than the Court's current approach, create the appearance that the Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is driven by the personal political views of the Justices,

rather than constitutional principle.
45. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 36, at 1674-75 (noting the indeterminacy of

contextual evidence).
46. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 1350 ("'Congressional debates on the Eleventh

Amendment were not recorded nor were those in the state legislatures, so only a bare outline
of the proceedings is available. Moreover, there are few references to the Amendment in the
correspondence and other writings of those who took part in the deliberations."' (quoting
Clyde Jacobs, Prelude to Amendment: The States Before the Court, 12 Am. J. Legal Hist.

19, 19 (1968))).
47. For the diversity theorists, this "unsaid" is that federal question jurisdiction was
assumed to override state sovereign immunity. For the sovereign immunity theorists, it is
precisely the opposite.
48. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 1349-51.
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in federal court under federal law was clearly established under the
Constitution." 49 Larry Marshall has made similar observations. 50 Even
Justice Lewis Powell, in arguing for the state sovereign immunity theory,
admitted that the historical evidence is "ambiguous." 5 1 The fact that the
original meaning of the Eleventh Amendment has so divided the legal
community for so long, and the crucial role played by the "unsaid" in the
diversity and state sovereign immunity
interpretations, suggests that this
52
ambiguity may well be irresolvable.
2. War Everlasting?
Despite the apparently irresolvable ambiguity of the historical evidence,
neither the diversity theorists nor the sovereign immunity proponents show
any signs of relenting. This is true to a degree in the academic
community. 53 It is particularly true, however, and of course much more
regrettable, on the Court. Traditionally, when one view loses in the
Supreme Court, the next time the issue comes before the Court, the Justices
holding that view will either follow the precedent established in the
previous case or find a way to reframe the issue to distinguish it. The
dissenters in the Court's recent Eleventh Amendment cases, however, have
taken a much more direct-and much less temperate-approach. 54 In
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board,5 5 for example, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by three
other Justices, wrote in dissent that he was simply "not yet ready to adhere
to the proposition of law set forth in Seminole Tribe."'56 A year later,
Justice John Paul Stevens, also joined by three other Justices, went further:
49. Fletcher, supra note 22, at 1077; see id. at 1069 ("The precise character of the state

sovereignty that remained was not, and probably could not have been, made clear when the
Constitution was adopted.").
50. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 1350 ("[T]here remain far too many unanswered
questions and incongruities to support either of these theories as established historical
fact.").

51. Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987)
(plurality opinion).

52. Marshall and Manning both argue that this situation militates in favor of adopting a
textualist interpretation as the best approximation of original meaning. But a committed
originalist need not, and perhaps should not, accept this view. The original meaning of any
text-plain or otherwise-is always a function of historical context. Widely held political
and philosophical presuppositions are often more significant determinants of meaning than
dictionary definitions. Thus, especially in interpreting historically remote constitutional
provisions, it makes little sense to accord text the kind of presumptive weight that Marshall
and Manning argue for.
53. See generally Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L.

Rev. 485 (2001) (advocating state sovereign immunity theory); Randall, supra note 6
(advocating diversity theory).
54. Of course, the Court's current majority took exactly the same approachdistinguished only by its success-in Seminole Tribe, where they seized the first opportunity
to overrule Union Gas.
55. Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999)
56. Id. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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"I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent.... The
kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe, Alden v.
Maine, [etc.] ...represents such a radical departure from the proper role of
'57
this Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises.
This language suggests that future Eleventh Amendment cases will
continue to bitterly divide the Court. Indeed, in a very interesting analysis
of recent Eleventh Amendment cases, Neil Siegel has offered a formal
game theoretic argument showing that the Court's present cycle of tit-fortat retaliation is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, or at least until
the Court undergoes a substantial personnel change. 5 8
II. CASUALTIES
So why not just let the war go on? Two reasons: First, the broad
sovereign immunity principle embraced by the Court's current majority has
produced an incoherent Eleventh Amendment doctrine-a doctrine that is
internally inconsistent, difficult to reconcile with the constitutional text, and
difficult for lower courts to administer. Second, the fact that the Court has
been fighting the same fight for twenty years and that all its major Eleventh
Amendment decisions during that period have been decided five-four (or
even more narrowly), and that the alignment of Justices has fallen so
predictably along political lines, has undercut the appearance that the
Court's decisions in this area are the product of constitutional principle,
rather than the personal political views of the Justices. These are the
casualties of the Supreme Court's long war over the Eleventh Amendment,
and they are substantial.
A. DoctrinalCoherence
The coherence of any constitutional doctrine is measured in two waysby its own internal consistency and by its consistency with the applicable
constitutional text and framing principles. The Court's current Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence fails badly on both of these measures.
1. The Ambiguous Origins of State Sovereign Immunity
The Court has never developed a consistent theory about the
constitutional origins of the broad doctrine of state sovereign immunity
articulated in its recent cases. A number of cases speak of the doctrine as
synonymous with the Eleventh Amendment itself-as if that Amendment,
57. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. As Siegel frames it, Union Gas was the first volley in this cycle, which provoked
Seminole Tribe, which has in turn provoked ten years of dissents refusing to accept the rule
of Seminole Tribe. See Neil S. Siegel, State Sovereign Immunity and Stare Decisis: Solving

the Prisoners' Dilemma Within the Court, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1165, 1182 (2001) ("A standard
game theoretic analysis validates Justice John Paul Stevens's reasoning: In light of the
conservative wing's previous abandonment of precedent in Union Gas, the liberal bloc
should do the same with Seminole Tribe when it has the requisite five votes in order to
'punish' the other side for 'defecting,' thereby deterring similar defections in the future.").
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despite its precisely limited text, nonetheless embodied a bar on all citizen
suits against states without their consent. 59 Other cases trace this broad
sovereign immunity principle not to the Eleventh Amendment, but rather to
the presuppositions that it confirmed. 60 Still other cases rely on textually
unmoored references to constitutional structure or the principles of
federalism, the apparent idea being that the states entered the union "with
their sovereignty intact" and that allowing states to be subject to suits by
individuals in federal courts is inconsistent with that sovereignty. 6 1 At least
one case, Alden v. Maine, traced the state sovereign immunity principle
partially to the Tenth Amendment, 62 which states that the "powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 63 The
argument in Alden, while somewhat free-form, seemed to be that subjecting
states to suits by individuals without their consent was a power not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution.
Each of these views has significant problems, as the Court's inability to
settle on any one of them suggests. 64 The Eleventh Amendment itself
actually says nothing about sovereign immunity. By its plain terms, it is an
absolute but narrowly limited jurisdictional bar, which does not, unlike the
state sovereign immunity principle, admit consent to suit as an exception.
Thus, the view that the Eleventh Amendment contains a broad sovereign
immunity principle is particularly difficult to support. The presuppositions
argument, too, is problematic because it rests on actively controverted
historical evidence, and because it constitutionalizes unratified, taken-forgranted views whose legal status--common law doctrine or structural
principle?-is deeply uncertain. The reliance on amorphous, extratextual
principles of federalism suffers from the same defects, but to an even
greater extent, given the broader scope and less precise definition of the
principles invoked.
The Tenth Amendment argument advanced in Alden and seldom
mentioned since would, as Justice Souter's dissent points out, make the
Eleventh Amendment mere surplusage. 65 Moreover, there appears to be
59. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 669 ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment

accomplished much more:
It repudiated the central premise of Chisholm that the
jurisdictional heads of Article III superseded the sovereign immunity that the States
possessed before entering the Union.").
60. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
61. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-31 (1999) (citing Blatchford, 501 U.S. at
779).

62. Id.at 713-14.
63. U.S. Const. amend. X.
64. Cf Alden, 527 U.S. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The sequence of the Court's

positions prompts a suspicion of error, and skepticism is confirmed by scrutiny of the
Court's efforts to justify its holding. There is no evidence that the Tenth Amendment
constitutionalized a concept of sovereign immunity as inherent in the notion of statehood,
and no evidence that any concept of inherent sovereign immunity was understood
historically to apply when the sovereign sued was not the font of the law.").
65. See id.at 760-61.
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little logical relationship between the general Tenth Amendment conception
that the federal government can only exercise powers delegated to it and the
sovereign immunity question. To hold otherwise, the Alden Court was
forced to adopt the tortured view that Congress cannot subject states to
unconsented suits by citizens as a necessary and proper means of
effectuating other congressional powers; instead, under the Tenth
Amendment, such power must be independently delegated to Congress.
This is not a convincing reading of that Amendment, especially so late in
the day of the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
2. The Chimerical Character of State Sovereign Immunity
The Court's attempts to define exactly what state sovereign immunity is
have been equally problematic. At times it has been explained as a limit on
subject matter jurisdiction, at others as a lack of personal jurisdiction, and
sometimes as an immunity or affirmative defense. 66 None of these
individual conceptions would allow the doctrine to do everything that the
Court wants it to do, or everything it would need it to do, in order to make
the Court's historical and textual accounts of the Eleventh Amendment
coherent. If sovereign immunity is understood as a question of personal
jurisdiction, for example, a state would have to be understood to waive its
claim to the defense simply by appearing to defend a suit. This result is
inconsistent with the Court's case law and also with the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, which states that the federal judicial power "shall not extend"
to certain suits against states, without any exception for cases in which
states voluntarily appear in court or otherwise waive their immunity.
On the other hand, if sovereign immunity is understood as a matter of
subject matter jurisdiction, courts would be required to dismiss actions
against states at any stage of litigation when the doctrine is asserted as a
defense (and perhaps even sua sponte), results also inconsistent with the
Court's case law. Further, a broad sovereign immunity doctrine cannot be a
limit of subject matter jurisdiction because then states could never consent
to suit; the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by
consent. 67 Yet the historical sovereign immunity principles on which the
Court's current doctrine is based clearly allowed for waiver by the state-in
fact the principle's very essence is immunity from unconsented suits by
individuals. 6 8
66. Katherine Florey, Insufficiently Jurisdictional: The Case Against Treating State
Sovereign Immunity as an Article 111 Doctrine, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1375, 1378-79 (2004)
("[T]he Court has failed to decide whether state sovereign immunity is a question of subject
matter jurisdiction... or something else entirely: an absence of personal jurisdiction, a
right, an affirmative defense, an absolute immunity, a power reserved to the states under the
Tenth Amendment, a common law doctrine, or simply a state of constitutional being ... ").
67. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) ("[S]ubject-matter
jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or
waived."); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (same).
68. Cf Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890) ("Undoubtedly a State may be sued by
its own consent ... ").
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Finally, the view of sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense or
absolute immunity cannot be reconciled with the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, which imposes an absolute restriction on the federal judicial
power-a classic limitation on subject matter jurisdiction. 6 9 Predictably, all
of this has created tremendous confusion for lower courts 70 which are
obligated to dismiss cases over which they have no subject matter
jurisdiction but cannot arbitrarily refuse to exercise jurisdiction if subject
71
matter jurisdiction exists.
3. The Mystery of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction
In addition to having a head of subject matter jurisdiction, the body of an
affirmative defense, and wings of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment case law has created a mystery surrounding
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over suits against states. As
Larry Marshall and Professor Vicki Jackson have both noted, 7 2 the
Eleventh Amendment, in limiting the exercise of federal "judicial power,"
does not appear to allow any exceptions for the Supreme Court's exercise
of that power. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has historically been quite
willing to exercise appellate jurisdiction over suits against states originating
in state courts. 73 Most of these decisions fail even to mention the Eleventh
Amendment or sovereign immunity as a possible issue. Jackson has
suggested that the only way to make sense of this mystery is to regard
sovereign immunity generally as a common law forum allocation principle,
requiring cases against states to be heard first in state court. 74 As Jackson
recognizes (but downplays), however, this view of sovereign immunity is
inconsistent with the Court's theory and practice, and as she could not have
known in 1988, is also in substantial tension with the Court's subsequent
decision in Alden. The apparent Supreme Court exception to the Eleventh
Amendment, then, adds just one more layer of internal inconsistency to the
Court's doctrinal account and to its attempt to square the broad historical
principle of sovereign immunity with the text of the Eleventh Amendment.
69. The only potential way to make some sense of the text of the Amendment and
historical principle would be to regard the Eleventh Amendment and that principle as being
of different kinds and imposing different limits, but this the Court has been unwilling to do.
70. Florey, supra note 66, at 1417-31. Compare, e.g., Seaborn v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.,
143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (lth

Cir. 1998) (holding that sovereign immunity defense is

"essentially" a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction and hence must be decided before
merits issues), with Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 53-57
(1st Cir. 1999) (holding that judicial economy and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
may justify deciding the merits before the Eleventh Amendment question).
71. Florey, supra note 66, at 1417.
72. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L.J. 1, 6 (1988); Marshall, supra note 1, at 1359.
73. Justice David Souter emphasizes this point in his Seminole Tribe dissent. See
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,517

U.S. 44,

100-85 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).

74. She articulates this view as a supplement to the diversity theory of the Eleventh
Amendment, perhaps mostly to make that view seems less revolutionary to Justices inclined
to take a broad view of state sovereign immunity. See Jackson, supra note 72, at 7.
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4. The Legal Fictions of Ex Parte Young 75 and Edelman v. Jordan76
As if these inconsistencies were not enough, the Court has felt compelled
to carve out a significant exception to the Eleventh Amendment's
prohibitive reach, in order to prevent state governments from being wholly
unaccountable for violations of individuals' federal rights. This exception
is commonly known as the Ex Parte Young fiction, an unflattering moniker
the Court itself has recently applied. As its name suggests, this fiction
arises from the case of Ex Parte Young, decided in 1908, in which the Court
held that although individuals could not sue state governments directly for
monetary damages, the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits against
individual state officials for equitable relief, even where such equitable
relief required these individuals to undertake remedial action in their
official capacities. 77 The rationale articulated for this fiction-it was not,
of course, originally admitted to be a fiction-is that state officials acting
ultra vires are not state actors because the state government has no
constitutional authority to violate federal law. The glaring flaw in this
holding, which explains why it is now regarded as fiction, is that the
violation of most federal constitutional rights requires the violator to be a
state actor. Thus, taken to its logical conclusion, the holding would
effectively mean that these individual rights cannot be violated, since
violation requires a state actor, but when a state actor violates federal rights
she automatically ceases to exercise the authority of the state. Nonetheless,
the fiction was necessary, given that the Court's broad interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment would otherwise leave states unaccountable for
acknowledged violations of federal rights.
Over time, Ex Parte Young predictably prompted plaintiffs to attempt to
characterize various forms of monetary relief as equitable, a development
which in turn prompted the Court, in Edelman v. Jordan,7 8 to cabin the Ex
Parte Young fiction with another fiction. That fiction was that "[w]hen the
action is in essence one for the recovery of money [even if the relief sought
is technically equitable], the state is the real, substantial party in interest and
is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit."'79

Under the

Edelman rule, a state official sued for nonpayment of federal benefits could
be ordered to process benefits applications going forward, but could not be
ordered to pay out past benefits owed, since that would "require[] the
payment of funds from the state treasury." 80 As should be obvious, the
ground for this distinction is fundamentally fictional. Suits against state
officers for injunctive relief that they will perform in their official
capacities are always essentially suits against the state, whether they seek to
require the state to disgorge benefits improperly withheld or to process
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

209 U.S. 123 (1908).
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-57.
415 U.S. 651.
Id. at 663 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).
Id. at 677.
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applications going forward that will require the state to pay more benefits in
the future. The only justification for drawing this distinction is the practical
one of shrinking the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. This fiction-upon-a-fiction is the icing on what Vicki Jackson
has aptly described as "[t]he complexity,
arcanity and deviousness of
'8 1
modem Eleventh Amendment law."
B. The Appearance of PrincipledDecision Making
The doctrinal incoherence of the Court's current Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, together with the persistent and apparently political divisions
among the Justices in this area, has wrought substantial damage on the
Court's appearance as a principled decision-making body.82 This damage
is most closely associated with the Court's abrupt reversal of Union Gas in
Seminole Tribe after a change in the Court's membership. It is also
underscored, however, by the mere fact that the Court has decided so many
sovereign immunity
cases by narrow margins, along such political lines, for
83
such a long time.
1. Union Gas and Seminole Tribe
As mentioned above, Union Gas,84 decided in 1989, was the only
Supreme Court case in which something like the diversity theory prevailed.
Decided 4-1-4, with Justice Brennan writing for the plurality and Justice
Byron White concurring in the judgment, Union Gas held that even if there
was a common law principle of sovereign immunity that Hans endorsed,
Hans did not suggest this principle was immune to congressional
abrogation. 85 This abrogation applied not only to the broad non-textual
sovereign immunity principle endorsed by the Court's current majority, but
also apparently to cases within the literal terms of the Eleventh
Amendment. 8 6 When Seminole Tribe came before the Court seven years
later, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White, and Marshall were gone, and the
conservatives seized the opportunity to explicitly reverse Union Gas. This
reversal raises more than the ordinary question of stare decisis. Rather,
81. See Jackson, supra note 72, at 73.
82. See id. at 125 ("[A]rticulated as a constitutional doctrine grounded in Article III and
the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity... is so inconsistent
with the establishment of judicial power over all federal questions cases ...that it lacks
credibility as a reasoned exegesis... [and] has detracted from the Court's ability to serve as
a principled expositor of the Constitution."); id.at 52 (noting that the Court's current
Eleventh Amendment approach does not serve "the image of judicial decisions flowing from
discernible principles rather than from competing personal views about policy").
83. Even Justice Scalia, for example, has suggested that the pitched, "repetitive" battles
of these cases have "despoiled our northern woods." Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 688 (1999).
84. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
85. See id. at 7.
86. The text of the Amendment, of course, does not seem to allow the federal judicial
power to extend to these cases with or without congressional action.
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what is particularly bothersome is that the majority in Seminole Tribe was a
new majority, created by change in the Court's personnel. As the Court
87
suggested in PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
reversing a controversial prior decision in the face of such a shift is exactly
the type of action that creates the corrosive impression that the Court's
decisions are acts of political will rather than the product of constitutional
88
principle.
2. Twenty Years of 5-4 Decisions
The appearance that the Court's decisions in this area are unprincipled is
reinforced by twenty years of Eleventh Amendment decisions dating back
to Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,89 in which the court has split 5-4,
or more narrowly, along political lines. The impression is further
underscored by the almost rebellious tenor of Justice Breyer's dissent in
College Savings Bank and Justice Stevens's even more strident dissent in
Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents.90 Together, these dissents constitute a
barely veiled assertion that the current majority's decisions on sovereign
immunity are illegitimate products of politically motivated judicial activism
and are therefore not worthy of the respect that they would normally be
accorded under the doctrine of stare decisis. It is not a long step from the
Court's decisions not commanding the adherence of dissenting Justices to
the Court's decisions not commanding the respect of the people.
Furthermore, the recent personnel changes on the Court raise the
possibility of a Seminole Tribe redux. 9 1 If either Chief Justice John Roberts
or Justice Samuel Alito, who replaced two of the Court's conservative
members, 92 turns out by some quirk to be a closet diversity theorist, there is
a distinct possibility that the Court might overturn Seminole Tribe, as it did
Union Gas, raising the ugly specter of two reversals in ten years on the
same issue, both triggered by changes in the Court's personnel.
As it happens, Chief Justice Roberts has already strongly signaled that he
does not subscribe to the diversity theory by joining Justice Clarence
Thomas's dissent in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz.93 In that
case, a five-Justice majority, which included Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
held that a state community college could not assert sovereign immunity as
a defense to a bankruptcy trustee's suit to recover preferential transfers,
repudiating dicta from Seminole Tribe in the process. 94 The Court did not
87. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

88. See id. at 864 (plurality opinion). The Casey opinion, of course, was coauthored by
two members of the Seminole Tribe majority.
89. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
90. 528 U.S. 62, 92-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. See Siegel, supra note 58, at 1170 (raising this possibility).
92. On the Eleventh Amendment, as on other states' rights issues, this group includes
Justice O'Connor.
93. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1005-14 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
94. Id. at 1004.
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rest its holding on the diversity theory; instead it reasoned that, by ratifying
the Bankruptcy Clause, the clear purpose of which was to eliminate the
injustice created by conflicting state laws, the States had consented to suit
in proceedings brought under federal bankruptcy law. 95 Thus, Roberts has
not actually voted against the diversity theory. But the strong embrace of
Seminole Tribe in Justice Thomas's dissent is a telling sign that Roberts's
allegiance lies with the sovereign immunity theorists.
Nevertheless, the willingness of the Katz majority to pare back Seminole
Tribe (and to retreat from Alden's clear declaration that no Article I power
implies the states' consent to suit 96) highlights the slender thread by which
those decisions-and thus the sovereign immunity theory-hang. Should
Chief Justice Roberts reconsider his position in a case that presents a
squarer choice between the sovereign immunity and diversity theories or
should Justice Alito cast his lot with the diversity theorists, a radically
different Eleventh Amendment would become the law of the land. These
scenarios may seem unlikely, given the solidly conservative pedigrees of
Roberts and Alito and the rigors of the contemporary vetting process for
judicial nominees. But their very possibility gives life to the impression
that the Court's decisions on the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign
immunity are acts of political will by the majority Justices, not the kinds of
studied, principled, legal decision making that give the Court its legitimacy.
It might, of course, be argued that if the proper reading of the Eleventh
Amendment is a toss-up from the standpoint of conventional legal
materials, as Part I suggests, then the Justices can be excused for departing
from their conventional judicial role. Indeed, it might be argued that, under
such circumstances, they have no choice but to rely on their personal
political views, and there is little point in pretending otherwise. 9 7 The next
part demonstrates that this is not the case.
III. TEXT AS TRUCE

We have now seen the problems that both sides of the war over the
Eleventh Amendment, the sovereign immunity proponents and the diversity
theorists, have created for themselves by sticking rigidly to their originalist
guns. They maintain their originalist reading even though the history of the
Eleventh Amendment is inconclusive, the resulting doctrine is inconsistent
both internally and with the constitutional text, and their ongoing struggle
creates the appearance that the Court is making political rather than judicial
decisions. One way for the Court to address these very serious problemsone way, in other words, for the Court to achieve a more coherent doctrine
that has greater stability and fewer legitimacy costs-would be to adopt a

95. Id.
96. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999); see also Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1005-06
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Foreward: A PoliticalCourt, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31 (2005).
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textualist interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, rather than a historical
interpretation, as a kind of truce.
A. Truce Terms
The terms of such a truce would be set by the text of the Eleventh
Amendment itself, read against the background of the Article III grant of
jurisdiction over "all cases" arising under the laws or Constitution of the
United States. The following subparts lay out these terms and provide the
first comprehensive analysis of the many conflicts between current
Supreme Court jurisprudence and the text of the Eleventh Amendment.9 8
1. The Contours of a Textualist Interpretation
It is helpful, in determining the contours of a textualist interpretation, to
break the text of the Eleventh Amendment down into its operative elements,
of which there are eight:
(1) The judicial power
(2) Of the United States
(3) Shall not be construed to extend
(4) To any suit
(5) In law or equity
(6) Commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
(7) By citizens of another state
(8) Or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
Each of these elements, if read according to its plain meaning, would
require the Court to modify some aspect of current Eleventh Amendment
doctrine.
First, the Eleventh Amendment limits only the "judicial power." A
textualist interpretation of this element would thus require the Court to
reach a different result in cases like Alden, where it held that state sovereign
immunity limits Congress'spower to create causes of action under federal
law in state courts, 99 and FederalMaritime Commission v. S.C. State Ports
Authority, where it held that the immunity implied by the Eleventh
Amendment limited the power of federal administrative agencies to compel
states to appear in quasi-adjudicative proceedings initiated at the behest of
citizens. 00 Of course, in cases where the Court is willing to hold squarely
that a particular administrative proceeding constitutes an exercise of the
federal "judicial power," the Eleventh Amendment would apply to that
98. Marshall addresses a few of these conflicts, but most of the crucial cases were
decided after 1987 when his essay was published. See generally Marshall, supra note 1.
Manning wrote more recently but ignores outright most of the conflicts discussed in these
subparts; those he does discuss he does not discuss in depth, presumably because he is more
concerned with the Eleventh Amendment's implications for interpretive theory than he is
with the Eleventh Amendment itself. See generally Manning, supra note 36.
99. Alden, 527 U.S. 706.
100. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
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proceeding, even under a textualist interpretation. But in FederalMaritime
Commission, the Court was unwilling to go so far.
Second, the Eleventh Amendment applies only to the judicial power of
the "United States." A textualist interpretation of this element would
require the court to reach a different result in Alden, which involved actions
in state courts.
Third, the language of the Eleventh Amendment is mandatory ("shall
not"), not permissive or conditional. A strict textualist interpretation of this
element would therefore require overturning all cases which have held that
sovereign immunity can be waived or that states can consent to suits that
would otherwise be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.10 1 Because the
Eleventh Amendment creates a binding limit on subject matter jurisdiction,
its operation cannot be waived or consented to by states. For the same
reason, there is no indication that it can be abrogated by Congress, 10 2 at
least under the powers Congress possessed at the time the Eleventh
Amendment was ratified, 10 3 or that an implied consent to suit "in the plan
of the convention" can authorize federal courts to hear suits that otherwise
fall within the plain scope of the Eleventh's Amendment's jurisdictional
limitation. 10 4 Finally, this element would bar the Supreme Court from
exercising appellate jurisdiction in suits against states by citizens of another
state initially brought in state court.
Fourth, the Eleventh Amendment bars the extension of the federal
judicial power to "any suit." Arguably, a strict textualist interpretation of
101. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184

(1964).

102. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding
state sovereign immunity recognized in Hans could be abrogated under Congress's Article I
powers); cf Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (rejecting congressional
abrogation under Article I powers for unconsented suits against states by citizens of any
state).
103. But cf Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (authorizing congressional
abrogation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
104. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1004 (2006) ("States agreed in the
plan of the Convention not to assert any sovereign immunity defense they might have had in
proceedings brought pursuant to 'Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies."'). If the states'
implied consent to suit in the ratification of the Bankruptcy Clause were the only ground for
Katz, that decision too would have to be overturned, at least insofar as it applies to suits
"against one of the United States by Citizens of another State." But, in addition to the states'
implied consent to be sued under federal bankruptcy law, Katz also emphasizes that
"bankruptcy jurisdiction, as understood today and at the time of the framing, is principally in
rem jurisdiction." Id. at 1000.
This classification may provide an alternate basis for
upholding the decision under a textualist interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, since a
court's jurisdiction in an in rem action is premised on the res sought to be recovered rather
than the "person" from whom it is sought (in Katz, the state of Virginia). It follows that the
recovery of a preferential transfer in bankruptcy is, at least arguably, "not a suit against a
State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment." See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v.
Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 451 (2004); id. at 446-51 (discussing the in rem exception to Eleventh
Amendment immunity); cf Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1002 n.10 ("We observe that the trustee in
this case ... seeks, in the alternative, both return of the 'value' of the preference, see 11
U.S.C. § 550(a), and return of the actual 'property transferred."').
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this element would require overturning Federal Maritime Commission,
since the proceeding before the Federal Maritime Commission at issue there
was not literally or even functionally equivalent to a suit. Rather, as Justice
Breyer's dissent argued, the administrative process at issue in that case
simply provided citizens an opportunity to lodge complaints with a
10 5
If
government agency about the actions of other parties, including states.
the agency, through a fact-finding procedure that resembled a traditional
trial, found that the state was in fact violating federal law, the agency itself,
not the citizen complainant, was authorized to seek damages from the state
by suing the state in federal court. Thus, the only potential "suit" at issue in
the case was not a suit by a citizen and thus clearly not one that would fall
06
within the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. 1
Fifth, the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional limitation applies only to
suits "in law or equity." Each of these terms had a settled legal meaning
when the Eleventh Amendment was drafted, and neither included suits in
admiralty jurisdiction, which was understood as distinct from jurisdiction in
law or equity. 10 7 A textualist reading of this element would therefore
require a different result in the Court's early twentieth-century decision of
Ex ParteNew York, which held that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit
in admiralty against the state of New York by its citizens. 108
Sixth, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits "commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States," not suits against state officials. A
textualist interpretation of this element would thus require modification of
the Ex Parte Young doctrine to allow suits against state officials, regardless
of the relief sought. This adjustment would not necessarily preclude an
Edelman-like judgment that some suits against state officials are actually
suits against states, subject to the jurisdictional limitations of the Eleventh
Amendment. But it would require such a judgment to be based on
principled grounds, rather than on the distinction between monetary and
injunctive relief, which artificially limited suits against state officials, while
adding nothing to the ability of courts to determine when suits against
officials were really suits against states.
Seventh, the Eleventh Amendment restricts federal jurisdiction only with
respect to suits against states "by citizens of another state," not with respect
to suits by a state's own citizens. A textualist interpretation would
therefore require abandoning the broad state sovereign immunity principle
embraced by the Court's current majority in favor of a precise limit on all
suits against states by citizens of another state. 10 9 Unlike the diversity
theory, a textualist reading of this limit would encompass suits with this

105. See Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 772-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. Provisions of Article III, Section 2, unaffected by the Eleventh Amendment grant
federal courts jurisdiction over suits brought by the United States against a state.
107. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 1355 n.53.
108. Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921).
109. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 1350-51.
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party alignment, even where a federal question provides an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction.
Eighth, and finally, the Eleventh Amendment restricts federal jurisdiction
over suits by "foreign citizens," not foreign states. On a textualist
interpretation, therefore, the Amendment would not affect federal question
jurisdiction in suits brought by foreign states, since these suits are not
explicitly prohibited by the text of the Amendment. Even more to the
point, it would leave intact the specific party-based jurisdiction that Article
III, Section 2, grants to federal courts in cases between states and foreign
states. For these reasons, a textualist interpretation would require a
different result in Monaco v. Mississippi, where the Court held that broad
"postulates" of state sovereign immunity derived from the Eleventh
Amendment barred suits against states brought by foreign states. 110
2. The Coherence of a Textualist Interpretation
To defend such a truce as a way to resolve the current deadlock, this
Essay must further overcome the conventional wisdom that a textualist
interpretation is incoherent or absurd. This conventional wisdom is based
primarily on four perceived anomalies a textualist interpretation would
produce. None of these, however, renders a textualist interpretation absurd
or incoherent.
a. The Foreign Citizen/ForeignState Distinction
First, the conventional wisdom presumes that it would be anomalous for
the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits against states by foreign citizens but
not by foreign states. This is the easiest of the perceived anomalies to
address and Larry Marshall effectively disposes of it. Although his
response is explicitly originalist and attempts to explain why the distinction
between suits by foreign states and foreign citizens might have made sense
in the historical context of 1795, his explanation also has significant
practical appeal today. Suits by foreign governments should be permitted
because these suits implicate the foreign policy interests of the federal
government in a way that suits by foreign citizens do not.IIl Furthermore,
since suits by foreign citizens are likely to be more numerous and thus more
costly than suits by foreign states, drawing the Eleventh Amendment line
between foreign states and foreign citizens represents a practical way to
protect states from excessive liability while minimizing the potential for
states to interfere with federal foreign policy interests.

110. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934).
111. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 1361. See generally Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme
Court of the United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court's
Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States Against
States, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1765 (2004).

2532

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

b. The Out-of-Stater/In-StaterDistinction
Second, it is perceived as anomalous that the Eleventh Amendment
would bar suits against states by citizens of other states without similarly
prohibiting suits by their own citizens. This perception has been perhaps
the most significant obstacle to a textualist interpretation historically and it
is the one on which the Hans Court relied in holding that the Eleventh
112
Amendment stood for a broad principle of state sovereign immunity.
This feature of the Amendment's plain text is perceived to be anomalous
for two reasons: First, suits by a state's own citizens are seen as offending
state sovereignty just as much if not more than suits by out-of-state citizens.
Second, suits against states by citizens of other states implicate the federal
interest in interstate comity in a way that suits by a state's own citizens do
not.
An initial response to these objections is that both the broad state
sovereign immunity view and the diversity interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment produce results that are at least as anomalous 113 and also at
odds with the Amendment's plain text, as seen in Part II. A more
substantive response, like the perceived anomaly itself, has two parts. First,
it is possible to see the distinction between out-of-state and in-state citizens
as a functional compromise, in the same way Larry Marshall argues that it
was a historical compromise. 1 14 In other words, this distinction balances
the need for government accountability with the need to protect states from
at least some kinds of liability. Since states today are still likely to violate
the federal rights of their own citizens more frequently than they violate the
federal rights of out-of-staters, allowing suits only by citizens may still be a
good way to protect federal rights, while preserving some limits on states'
potential liability. Second, the citizens of one state in their collective
capacity possess a sovereign interest vis-A-vis out-of-staters that a state
government does not possess vis-A-vis its own citizens-whose consent,
according to the principles of popular sovereignty, is the source and limit of
its power. 115 (There is an analogy to the sovereign authority of the United
States over foreigners, which is subject to fewer Constitutional constraints
than its sovereign authority over U.S. citizens.) Neither of these rationales
provides a perfectly satisfying explanation, but the costs of maintaining the
status quo, in terms of both doctrinal coherence and the Court's image as a
principled decision-making body, seem far higher.

112. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 7, 14-15 (1890).
113. In the case of the state sovereign immunity view, see the long list of inconsistencies
elaborated supra Part II.A. In the case cf the diversity theory, the chief anomaly is an
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment flatly at odds with its plain text.
114. See Marshall, supranote 1, at 1351-52.
115. Id. at 1370.
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c. Federal Causes ofAction in State Courts
Third, it is perceived as anomalous that the Eleventh Amendment would
allow Congress to subject states to suit in their own courts. To proponents
of the sovereign immunity theory, it makes little sense that the Amendment
would deny Congress power to use federal courts to subject states to suit
but allow it to engage in what immunity proponents view as the even more
coercive practice of forcing a state to be sued in its own courts. In Alden,
the Court attempts to give this view a historical pedigree by citing
McCulloch v. Maryland 16 for the proposition that the Constitution
specifically opted for a federal government with power to act on individuals
rather than a federal government with power to act on states. 117 This
argument, however, contains the seeds of the immunity theory's undoing.
It is true that Federalists like Chief Justice Marshall argued that the federal
government needed power to act over citizens directly, but they did so not
to prevent it from trampling on state sovereignty but because the Articles of
Confederation, which granted the national government power to act only on
18
and through states, had rendered the federal government impotent.'
States, under the Articles, were at liberty to comply with federal commands
if and when they chose to do so. With this background, an Eleventh
Amendment that requires Congress to act through state courts to subject
states to suit might easily be seen as less coercive, not more coercive than
the alternative of allowing it to act through federal courts.1 19 Contrary to
the assertions of the Alden majority, 120 this approach would also be wholly
116. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
117. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 753 (1999) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 424).
118. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall is making exactly this argument in the passage of
McCulloch quoted by the Alden majority. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 422 ("No trace is to be
found in the constitution, of an intention to create a dependence of the government of the
Union on those of the states, for the execution of the great powers assigned to it.... To
impose on it the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot control, which another
government may furnish or withhold, would render its course precarious, the result of its
measures uncertain, and create a dependence on other governments, which might disappoint
its most important designs, and is incompatible with the language of the constitution.").
119. The Alden majority certainly does not share Chief Justice Marshall's concern that
such a requirement would render the federal government impotent or give states free rein to
flout federal authority as they did routinely under the Articles. Indeed, the Alden Court sees
nothing exceptionable about a system in which "States and their officers are bound by
obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal statutes that comport with the
Constitutional design," which the federal government has no power to enforce against states
through the authorization of citizen suits. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755. The "good faith of the
States," the Court argues, "provides an important assurance that '[tihis Constitution and the
Laws of the United States, which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land."' Id. (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). It bears mentioning in
this regard that, by limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as well as the
original jurisdiction of lower federal courts, a textualist interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment would bar federal courts from hearing any appeals to state court judgments in
the class of cases governed by the Amendment. In this sense, a textualist interpretation, too,
would depend in significant part on the states' good faith.
120. See id.at 752 ("If Congress could displace a State's allocation of governmental
power and responsibility, the judicial branch of the State, whose legitimacy derives from
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consistent with the role and competence of state courts, which routinely
interpret and apply federal law, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.
d. Implicationsfor FederalSovereign Immunity
Finally, a textualist interpretation may be perceived as anomalous in that
it would seem to presuppose that all sovereign immunity ought to be
grounded directly in a constitutional text. Such a presupposition might call
into question the justification for federal sovereign immunity, a doctrine
with an impeccable historical pedigree that is very rarely questioned by
courts. There are three responses to this objection.
First, federal sovereign immunity might be implicit in the constitutional
text in a way that state sovereign immunity is not. The Constitution, after
all, created federal sovereignty by limiting the sovereignty of states in
important ways. Furthermore, it seems quite plausible that state sovereign
immunity, which is directly addressed by the Eleventh Amendment, ought
to be given contours consistent with and directly attributable to the specific
constitutional text on point, whereas federal sovereign immunity, which is
purely implied and does not find support in any particular textual provision,
might not be so limited.
Second, even if adopting a textualist interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment somehow implied the nonexistence of federal sovereign
immunity, it should not be assumed a priori that this would necessarily be a
bad outcome. Professor Akhil Amar, for example, has argued there is good
reason to think that federal sovereign immunity, like a broad principle of
state sovereign immunity, is inconsistent with the popular sovereignty
12 1
subscribed to by the Framers.
Third, the fact that federal sovereign immunity is virtually uncontested
and has produced few of the doctrinal inconsistencies that plague state
sovereign immunity means that it does not create either of the problems
created by the competing non-textualist approaches to state sovereign
immunity. Thus, the justifications this Essay offers for adopting a textualist
approach to the Eleventh Amendment should not undermine the doctrine of
federal sovereign immunity.
B. Precedent
Having established that a textualist interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment is coherent and would address significant problems created by
the Court's current originalist approach to sovereign immunity issues, it
remains to be shown that the textualist truce called for by this Essay is
consistent with the Court's historical practice. As evidence of this
consistency, this sub-part considers three seminal cases in which the Court
fidelity to the law, would be compelled to assume a role not only foreign to its experience
but beyond its competence ....
").
121. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1466
(1987).
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abandoned or eschewed a non-textualist, originalist interpretation in favor
of a textualist interpretation with an arguably inferior originalist pedigree.
In each case, the Court was motivated by the same costs this Essay
identifies with the Court's current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudencedoctrinal inconsistency and the appearance that the Court was making
political rather than principled decisions.
1. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.122
In Jones & Laughlin, decided in 1937, the Supreme Court retreated from
its pre-New Deal attempts to impose formalist non-textual limits on the
exercise of the federal commerce power, when the political context of the
Great Depression rendered it impossible for the Court to maintain its prior
practices without appearing to decide cases according to politics rather than
principle. This view of Jones & Laughlin's famous "switch in time,"
borrowed from Lawrence Lessig, 12 3 is directly parallel to the current
Eleventh Amendment context in a number of respects. Like the Court's
attempt to impose non-textual limits on the commerce power prior to Jones
& Laughlin, the Court's recent attempt to establish a broad, non-textual
state sovereign immunity principle is defended on originalist grounds but
has produced serious doctrinal inconsistencies, perhaps even greater than
124
the inconsistencies in the Court's pre-New Deal Commerce Clause cases.
Even more important, like the Commerce Clause cases circa 1937, the
Court's sovereign immunity cases have created the appearance that its
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is based on politics, not on
principle. Jones & Laughlin shows that, under these circumstances, the
Court has previously considered it appropriate to retreat to a stable,
coherent textualist interpretation, which is arguably inferior on originalist
grounds, in order to dispel the appearance of political decision making.
2. Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority

125

In Garcia, as in Jones & Laughlin, the Court abandoned a non-textual
limit on federal power, 12 6 in favor of a textualist interpretation of
Congress's Article I powers, which at least one of the Justices in the
122. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
123. Lawrence Lessig, TranslatingFederalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct.

Rev. 125, 177-78 ("Ordinarily, when a founding constitutional commitment is challenged, it
is the duty of the Court to stand up to the challenge, and defend the founding commitment

until changed by amendment. This minimum of courage is essential to a system of judicial
review. But what the New Deal represents, I suggest, is an important exception to this
principle. When the very act of defending this founding commitment has been rendered
political, then the obligations of the Frankfurter constraint may trump the obligations of
fidelity.").

124. See supra Part II.A.
125. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
126. In Garcia, the limit at issue was the bar on congressional regulation of "states qua
states" established in National League of Cities v. Usery. Id. at 547-48 (discussing Nat'l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
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majority believed was less consistent with framing values. 127 Garcia,
however, went one step beyond Jones & Laughlin in terms of candor. In
overturning National League of Cities v. Usery, 128 Justice Harry Blackmun
placed particular emphasis on the Court's inability to apply the "states qua
states" rule in a principled-i.e., a judicial-fashion. 12 9 As mentioned
130
above, this concern was present, though implicit, in Jones & Laughlin.
In this respect, Garcia and Jones & Laughlin were both responding to
concerns analogous to
those this Essay has examined in the Eleventh
3
Amendment context. 1
The situation faced by the Court in these cases, however, was not exactly
parallel to the Court's current Eleventh Amendment predicament. In both
Garcia and Jones & Laughlin, the Court's decisions had been made to
appear political because they could no longer be applied to individual fact
situations in a way that seemed principled over time. Therefore, the Court's
judgments risked coming across as mere acts of political will that it was
making up as it went along. This is analogous to the doctrinal incoherence
created by the Court's current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and the
administrability problems it has created for lower federal courts. But there
is an additional reason for the appearance of political decision making in
the Eleventh Amendment context, as the next sub-part will discuss at
32
greater length. 1
33
3. PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey

Casey addresses the role of appearance in judicial decision making more
explicitly than any other Supreme Court decision before or since. Decided
in 1992, shortly after Justice Souter's appointment, the Court in Casey
considered a Pennsylvania law severely restricting women's abortion rights.
134
Prior to this case, the Court had been slowly undermining Roe v. Wade
35
for several years.1 Meanwhile, Republican presidents Ronald Reagan and
127. See Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
128. 426 U.S. 833.
129. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 543, 544, 546 (describing the "states qua states" doctrine as
"unworkable" and "result[ing] in line-drawing of the most arbitrary sort" and "inevitably
invit[ing] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it
favors and which ones it dislikes").
130. Cf Lessig, supra note 123, at 177.
131. Justice O'Connor's dissent in Garcia makes the analogy to the Eleventh
Amendment context particularly clear. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (describing the GarciaCourt as "survey[ing] the battle scene of federalism and
sound[ing] a retreat").
132. The Eleventh Amendment is also different in another crucial respect. Because its
original meaning remains irresolvably ambiguous, the obligations of fidelity to meaning that
might weigh against adopting a textualist interpretation for institutional reasons are
substantially weakened. This makes a textualist truce in the Eleventh Amendment context
even more defensible than it was in the New Deal context.

133. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
134. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding a state
abortion funding ban and other related provisions).
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George H.W. Bush had been appointing Justices to the Court with the
specific intent of reversing Roe. Justices Anthony Kennedy and Souter, for
136
example, had both been appointed at least partially with that motivation.
Furthermore, it is generally believed that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
1 37
were opposed to the Court's decision in Roe before joining the Court.
Yet in a truly remarkable joint opinion in Casey, these three Justices
refused to overturn Roe, not because of that decision's correctness as a
matter of constitutional principle, but rather on the grounds that the Court
should not reverse its position in response to a change in its membership
because that would create the impression that the court was deciding
38
politically.'
Applying this principle to the state sovereign immunity context, it is clear
that the Court's reversal of Union Gas in Seminole Tribe, as a direct result
of the Court's change in membership, creates exactly the appearance of
unprincipled decision making that the joint opinion in Casey identified as a
threat to judicial legitimacy. Furthermore, given the recent changes in
Court personnel, along with the hair's-breadth division of the Court on state
sovereign immunity issues, 139 there is real reason for concern that this
appearance of political decision making could be magnified in the near
future. It is first and foremost to avoid this outcome, which the joint
opinion in Casey rightly recognized as a disaster for the Court and for the
rule of law, 140 that this Essay proposes the textualist truce described above.
136. See generally John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and
Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 Va. L. Rev. 833,
842-54 (1991) (discussing the politics of abortion in the Reagan and Bush appointment
processes).
137. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., How Is ConstitutionalLaw
Made?, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1265, 1282 (2002) (book review) (noting the "previously
expressed position [of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy] that Roe had been wrongly
decided"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the PrecedentialEffect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535, 1559 (2000) ("For
O'Connor and Kennedy, Casey was about stare decisis, not substantive due process."); cf
Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (joint opinion) ("We do not need to say whether each of us, had we
been Members of the [Roe] Court when the valuation of the state interest came before it as
an original matter, would have concluded ... that its weight is insufficient to justify a ban on
abortions prior to viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions.").
138. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 864 (joint opinion) ("'A basic change in the law upon a
ground no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular misconception that
this institution is little different from the two political branches of the Government. No
misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is
our abiding mission to serve."' (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636
(1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting))).
139. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006).
140. It is uncontroversial that, all else equal, it is better for the Court to be perceived as a
principled expositor of the Constitution. Justice Scalia's Casey dissent, however, scoffs at
the idea that the need to appear principled could ever justify departing from what
constitutional principle itself requires. Casey, 505 U.S. at 998 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). This argument, as Deborah Hellman points out, is
fundamentally question begging. If principled judicial decision making requires attention to
appearances, the principled result cannot simply be determined by what principles other than
the importance of appearing principled require. See Deborah Hellman, Judging by
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C. Easingthe Transition
The biggest hurdle remaining for this proposal lies in explaining how the
Court can make the transition to a textualist interpretation without causing
serious disruption, since adopting a textual interpretation would require the
Court to overrule a significant number of cases. There are three principal
ways for the Court-and thus this Essay-to clear this hurdle.
First, as Larry Marshall and John Manning have shown, 14 1 there is
enough historical support for textualist interpretation that the Court could
use the cover of an originalist interpretation in adopting a textualist truce,
much as it used an originalist cover to retreat from its pre-New Deal
Commerce Clause doctrines in Jones & Laughlin. In particular Marshall
and Manning show that there is reason to think that precise constitutional
texts reflect pragmatic political compromise rather than grand principles
like those relied upon by sovereign immunity and diversity theorists. This
finding is sufficiently resonant with the Court's statutory interpretation
jurisprudence that it could at least provide rhetorical cover for a textualist
truce, if the Court perceived such cover to be necessary.' 42
Second, the Court might adopt the kind of case-law-sensitive approach to
statutory construction in this area that Justice Antonin Scalia used in his
Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation143
concurrence to avoid reaching the state sovereign immunity issue shortly
after he joined the Court. 144 Because a large number, if not a majority, of
currently existing federal statutes were passed when Congress would have
assumed that states enjoyed sovereign immunity from suits by individuals,
the Court could-and indeed should-avoid reading these statutes as
intending to subject states to suit wherever possible. This approach would
substantially reduce the initial destabilizing effect of a textualist truce.
Third, and I do not think it necessary to go this far, the Court could
soften the impact of a textualist truce by holding that the broad sovereign
immunity principle as recognized in previous cases is a common law
principle rather than a constitutional principle.145 Taking this view would
effectively turn state sovereign immunity into a default rule. Wherever
Congress has not expressly indicated its intent to modify the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Court would find that this common law
Appearances: ProfessionalEthics, Expressive Government, and the Moral Significance of

How Things Seem, 60 Md. L. Rev. 653, 672 (2001) (noting that, if appearance is significant
at all, the "right [or in this case, principled] action [cannot be] that which is mandated by
[factors other than appearance] only").
141. See supra Part I.B.3 (describing the arguments of these two textualists).
142. Alternatively, the Court could persuasively rely on Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954), to hold that it is impossible to "turn the clock back," in this case
to 1795, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted. Only eighty-six years had passed
between the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Court's decision in Brown.
More than 200 years have passed since the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment.
143. Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
144. See id. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145. This is essentially the view the plurality took in Union Gas and the view Justice
Souter supports in his Seminole Tribe dissent.
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principle bars suits against states by individuals without their consent. A
similar approach has been endorsed by Vicki Jackson. 146 The approach
would also be consistent with the Court's treatment of common law
doctrines of official immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Together, these three impact-softening measures show that the
destabilizing effect of a textualist truce could be substantially mitigated. In
any event, some instability in this area would be a small price for the Court
to avoid further casualties in the current war over the Eleventh Amendment.
In this regard, it is worth noting that the Court has not shied away from
effecting tectonic shifts in its approach to particular areas of constitutional
law in attempting to avoid the appearance of political decision making.
Jones & Laughlin is an obvious example. The Eleventh Amendment is not
the Commerce Clause in the New Deal era, of course. But as earlier
discussion has shown, the doctrine is rife with inconsistencies. These
inconsistencies, together with the persistence of intensely political divisions
on the Court for more than twenty years (and particularly its reversal of
Union Gas in Seminole Tribe after a change in the Court's membership),
have created the distinct appearance that the Court's jurisprudence in this
area has been swayed by the personal preferences of the Justices, rather
than constitutional principle. Even if a textualist truce would create a major
upheaval, therefore, it might well be worth that price.
CONCLUSION

This Essay has proposed that the Supreme Court adopt a textualist
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to eliminate the doctrinal
incoherence created by its current approach and to reduce the appearance of
political decision making produced by Seminole Tribe's reversal of Union
Gas, along with twenty years of 5-4 decisions in this area along political
lines. A textualist truce is consistent with the Court's historical practice of
abandoning non-textual originalist principles when the costs of maintaining
such principles become too great. Furthermore, contrary to conventional
wisdom, a textualist interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is
doctrinally coherent and would produce no more-and probably feweranomalous results than the current sovereign immunity approach or the
diversity theory. These competing originalist approaches have dominated
the judicial and academic discourse for more than 100 years, but they have
not resolved the historical ambiguity surrounding the Eleventh
Amendment's original meaning. Neither legal principle nor the Court's
previous practice requires it to continue this costly and unproductive battle
indefinitely. It is time for a textualist truce in the war over the Eleventh
Amendment.

146. See Jackson, supra note 72, at 74-75.
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